Psychotic-like anomalous self-experiences in feeding and eating disorders: Their role in eating psychopathology through the mediation of body uneasiness and embodiment and identity disorders.

BACKGROUND: Psychotic-like anomalous self-experiences (ASEs) are core and early features of schizophrenia spectrum disorders, which have been recently also postulated to underlie embodiment disturbance in feeding and eating disorders (FEDs). The present study was aimed at investigating the interplay between ASEs and specific psychopathology in FED. METHODS: Ninety persons with Anorexia Nervosa and 41 with Bulimia Nervosa were evaluated with the inventory of psychotic-like anomalous self-experiences (IPASE), identity and eating disorders (IDEA), body uneasiness test (BUT), and eating disorder examination questionnaire (EDE-Q). The same assessment was performed for 92 subjects recruited from the general population. Structural equation modelling was employed to test the role of embodiment/identity disorders in mediating the relationship between ASEs and ED psychopathology. RESULTS: Patients with FED displayed high scores on IPASE, comparable with people with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. A significant correlation was also demonstrated between IPASE, BUT and EDE-Q. All IPASE domains were strongly related to feeling extraneous from one's own body by IDEA. All IPASE domains demonstrated a high relationship with BUT Depersonalization scale. A strong correlation was also reported between total scores of IPASE and IDEA. The mediation model confirmed that ASEs impact on FED symptomatology through the mediation of both embodiment/identity disorders and body image. DISCUSSION: Anomalous interoceptive processes may represent the first step of a maladaptive process-impairing embodiment, selfhood, and identity in FED. Assessment of ASEs might be a valid tool to identify an early-shared vulnerability of severe disorders characterized by embodiment alterations.

Dysphoria as trans-diagnostic mood symptom and as lived experience. Lessons from prose, poetry and philosophy.

This paper attempts to provide a characterisation of it from a first-person perspective of dysphoria, answering the question 'how it feels like to be dysphoric?'. Starting with a definition of emotions as embodied phenomena that provide the person with a felt motivation to move, a rich characterisation of dysphoria is provided centred on the coenesthetic and kinesthetic feelings inherent to this emotion. To fulfil this task, a selected choice of literary, poetic, theatrical and philosophical texts is used to compensate for the quasi-ineffability of the contrasting feelings inherent to dysphoria. Current definitions of dysphoria only highlight the 'negative' side of dysphoria, including irritability, discontent, surrender and interpersonal resentment. A more accurate characterisation necessitates the recognition of the 'positive' side of dysphoria and the ambiguities and contradictions inherent in this emotion. Dysphoric persons feel burdened by a weight that prevents them from moving and simultaneously incites movement. The inertia that accompanies dysphoria is inextricably tied in with a vital urge, however disordered and purposeless. Dysphoria is experienced both as a deadly stagnation and as a chaotic, wild impulse that brings with it an inane aspiration to explore the darkest parts of one's self in search of a glimmer of meaning and authenticity. This characterisation of dysphoria can help to differentiate it from other emotions such as sadness, anger, anxiety and anguish, and thus to identify it more precisely within the spectrum of mood disorders.

The primacy of ocular perception: a narrative review on the role of gender identity in eating disorders.

BACKGROUND: Phenomenological research has enriched the scientific and clinical understanding of Eating Disorders (ED), describing the significant role played by disorders of embodiment in shaping the lived experience of patients with ED. According to the phenomenological perspective, disorders of embodiment in ED are associated with feelings of alienation from one's own body, determining an excessive concern for external appearance as a form of dysfunctional coping. The purpose of the present narrative review is to address the role of gender identity as a risk factor for EDs in the light of phenomenological approaches. METHODS: Narrative review. RESULTS: The current study discusses the interplay between perception, gender identity, and embodiment, all posited to influence eating psychopathology. Internalized concerns for body appearance are described as potentially associated with self-objectification. Furthermore, concerns on body appearance are discussed in relation to gendered social expectations. The current review also explores how societal norms and gender stereotypes can contribute to dysfunctional self-identification with external appearances, particularly through an excessive focus on the optical dimension. The socio-cultural perspective on gender identity was considered as a further explanation of the lived experience of individuals with ED. CONCLUSIONS: By acknowledging the interplay between these factors, clinicians and researchers can gain a deeper understanding of these disorders and develop more effective interventions for affected individuals. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level V narrative review.

Affective Permeability: On Hysteria and Atmospheres.

BACKGROUND: Phenomenological literature has recently given much attention to the concept of atmosphere, which is the pre-individual affective tonality of the intersubjective space. The importance of atmospheres in psychopathology has been described for various disorders, but little is known about the interaction with hysteria. The aim of the present paper was to describe the psychopathology of hysteria from the angle of the phenomenon of atmosphere, focussing on the hysterical person's peculiar "affective permeability". SUMMARY: Hysterical people have difficulty defining themselves autonomously. As compensation, they adopt models transposed from the external environment such as social gender stereotypes or are influenced by the gaze and desire of others. They also possess a special sensitivity in perceiving the affectivity present in a given social situation, by which they are easily impressed and influenced. Their sensibility to environmental affectivity may allow them to take centre stage, assuming the postures and behaviours that others desire and that they sense by "sniffing" the atmosphere in which the encounter is immersed. Thus, a paradox may take place: sensibility is not mere passivity in hysteria but may become a tool for "riding" the emotional atmosphere and manipulating it. KEY MESSAGES: Affective permeability to environmental atmospheres and manipulation of the environment are the two sides of the same coin. This overlap of passive impressionability and active manoeuvring is necessary to be grasped in the clinical encounter with hysterical persons not to be submerged by their theatricality, that is, by the hyper-intensive expressivity of their feelings and behaviours.

Logics of Discovery II: Lessons from Poetry-Parataxis as a Method That Can Complement the Narrative Compulsion in Vogue in Contemporary Mental Health Care.

This paper highlights the limitations of narrative logic in mental health care, and in particular of "narrative vigilance"-the tendency to watch over experience via narrativisation, and to tether the concrete particulars of experience to the hypothetical structure of a narrative signification. Narrative logic is grounded in hypotaxis-the syntactic structuring whereby a discourse is characterised by different levels of subordination using linking words that connect, especially in terms of temporal and explanatory consequentiality. I offer an alternative approach based on parataxis-the practice of placing phrases or parts of speech next to each other without subordinating conjunctions. Sentences are juxtaposed without a clear connection; the contrast may generate novel and unexpected combinations between these dissimilar fragments. After distinguishing between parataxis and psychopathological phenomena like disturbances of association, I take inspiration from the work and life of a poet, Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843), considered among the greatest. He suffered for half his life from a severe form of mental illness that would perhaps, today, be diagnosed as schizophrenia. In the poems written during his illness, hypotaxis and narrative vigilance seem to blur, and parataxis takes centre stage. The fading of narrative structure in no way coincides with the absence of meaningfulness. Rather, meaningfulness is left to parataxis itself, that is, to the recombining power of words, sentences, and images. Parataxis itself can provide meaningfulness or, at least, provide the soil in which it can germinate. The void of narration opens the door for the fullness of "emergent" connections. In the final part of the paper, with the help of Freud's ideas on the relationship between "analysis" and "synthesis" in psychoanalytic treatment, some implications are derived about the relevance of parataxis to the logics of discovery in psychotherapeutic care, especially that of persons with severe mental conditions.

Phenomenology yesterday, today, and tomorrow: a proposed phenomenological response to the double challenges of contemporary recovery-oriented person-centered mental health care.

This paper argues that a dialectical synthesis of phenomenology's traditional twin roles in psychiatry (one science-centered, the other individual-centered) is needed to support the recovery-oriented practice that is at the heart of contemporary person-centered mental health care. The paper is in two main sections. Section I illustrates the different ways in which phenomenology's two roles have played out over three significant periods of the history of phenomenology in 20th century psychiatry: with the introduction of phenomenology in Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology in 1913; with the development a few years later of structural phenomenological psychopathology; and in the period of post-War humanism. Section II is concerned with the role of phenomenology in contemporary mental health. There has been a turn to phenomenology in the current period, we argue, in response to what amounts to an uncoupling of academic psychiatry from front-line clinical care. Corresponding with the two roles of phenomenology, this uncoupling has both scientific aspects and clinical aspects. The latter, we suggest, is most fully expressed in a new model of "recovery," defined, not by the values of professionals as experts-by-training, but by the values of patients and carers as experts-by-experience, specifically, by what is important to the quality of life of the individual concerned in the situation in question. We illustrate the importance of recovery, so defined, and the challenges raised by it for both the evidence-base and the values-base of clinical decision-making, with brief clinical vignettes. It is to these challenges we argue, that phenomenology through a synthesis of its twin roles is uniquely equipped to respond. Noting, however, the many barriers to such a synthesis, we argue that in the current state of development of the field, it is by way of a dialectical synthesis of phenomenology's roles that we should proceed. From such a dialectic, a genuine synthesis of roles may ultimately emerge. We conclude with a note on the wider significance of these developments, arguing that contrary to 20th century stereotypes, they show psychiatry to be leading the way for healthcare as a whole, in developing the resources for 21st century person-centered clinical care.

The lived experience of depression: a bottom-up review co-written by experts by experience and academics.

We provide here the first bottom-up review of the lived experience of depression, co-written by experts by experience and academics. First-person accounts within and outside the medical field were screened and discussed in collaborative workshops involving numerous individuals with lived experience of depression, family members and carers, representing a global network of organizations. The material was enriched by phenomenologically informed perspectives and shared with all collaborators in a cloud-based system. The subjective world of depression was characterized by an altered experience of emotions and body (feeling overwhelmed by negative emotions, unable to experience positive emotions, stuck in a heavy aching body drained of energy, detached from the mind, the body and the world); an altered experience of the self (losing sense of purpose and existential hope, mismatch between the past and the depressed self, feeling painfully incarcerated, losing control over one's thoughts, losing the capacity to act on the world; feeling numb, empty, non-existent, dead, and dreaming of death as a possible escape route); and an altered experience of time (experiencing an alteration of vital biorhythms, an overwhelming past, a stagnation of the present, and the impossibility of the future). The experience of depression in the social and cultural context was characterized by altered interpersonal experiences (struggling with communication, feeling loneliness and estrangement, perceiving stigma and stereotypes), and varied across different cultures, ethnic or racial minorities, and genders. The subjective perception of recovery varied (feeling contrasting attitudes towards recovery, recognizing recovery as a journey, recognizing one's vulnerability and the need for professional help), as did the experience of receiving pharmacotherapy, psychotherapy, and social as well as physical health interventions. These findings can inform clinical practice, research and education. This journey in the lived experience of depression can also help us to understand the nature of our own emotions and feelings, what is to believe in something, what is to hope, and what is to be a living human being.

The Autism Rating Scale for Schizophrenia - Revised English Version: An Instrument to Characterize Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders Phenotype.

Dis-sociality (DS) reflects the impairment of social experience in people with schizophrenia; it encompasses both negative features (disorder of attunement, inability to grasp the meaning of social contexts, the vanishing of social shared knowledge) and positive features (a peculiar set of values, ruminations not oriented to reality), reflecting the existential arrangement of people with schizophrenia. DS is grounded on the notion of schizophrenic autism as depicted by continental psychopathology. A rating scale has been developed, providing an experiential phenotype. Here we present the Autism Rating Scale for Schizophrenia - Revised English version (ARSS-Rev), developed on the Italian version of the scale. The scale is provided by a structured interview to facilitate the assessment of the phenomena investigated here. ARSS-Rev is composed of 16 distinctive items grouped into 6 categories: hypo-attunement, invasiveness, emotional flooding, algorithmic conception of sociality, antithetical attitude toward sociality, and idionomia. For each item and category, an accurate description is provided. Different intensities of phenomena are assessed through a Likert scale by rating each item according to its quantitative features (frequency, intensity, impairment, and need for coping). The ARSS-Rev has been able to discriminate patients with remitted schizophrenia from euthymic patients with psychotic bipolar disorder. This instrument may be useful in clinical/research settings to demarcate the boundaries of schizophrenia spectrum disorders from affective psychoses.

The heterogeneity of depressions: A phenomenological viewpoint.

What is commonly referred to as "depression" indicates a heterogeneous complex disorder that includes distinct psychopathological forms. A more accurate classification can be achieved by assessing the individual experiences of depression and tracing back each of these forms to the specific vulnerable structure from which they emerge. Each of these vulnerable forms of existence can be characterized by focusing on their values. I identify four main prototypes. Homo melancholicus is impressive for their over-normality, extreme social adjustment, and conformism; their depressive decomposition is characterized by the experience of loss. The values of homo œconomicus are utility (every action must be directed toward production) and optimization (what costs more than it produces is a dead branch to be cut); their depressive decomposition is marked by insolvency. Homo dissipans' values are excess (feeling animated by an inexhaustible drive to "pour out" of oneself, especially outside the limits of composure and reasonableness) and expenditure (an ethical attitude that gives its approval to excess and to its metamorphic and destructive power); their depressive decomposition is epitomized by inner incoherence and emptiness. The style of homo nevroticus form of existence is subjugated by the condemnation to limitation and the diktat of prohibition; their depressive decomposition is characterized by frustration and demoralization.

The Body in Question in the Existence of Hysteric Persons: A Phenomenological Perspective.

The concept of hysteria, although apparently surpassed by contemporary nosographic classifications, continues to be talked about. Following Charbonneau's attempt to de-feminize and de-sexualize hysteria, clinical phenomenology can offer a perspective which, freed from stigma and prejudices through the suspension of judgement, allows us to understand hysteria not as a diagnostic category but as an existential position. In this sense, hysteria would be based on a hypo-sufficiency of the embodied self, which is not perceived as solid and continuous and needs external confirmations of its adequacy. According to the optical-coenaesthetic disproportion hypothesis, the hypo-sufficiency of the embodied self originates from the difficulty of experiencing one's body from the first-person perspective and from the consequent use of the gaze of others as a prosthesis to achieve a sense of selfhood and identity. Hysteric persons develop a mode of access to their corporeality mediated by visual representations - hence the theatricalization, centrality, and seductiveness of hysteric persons' behaviour. We suggest to call "figural body" the visual apprehension of one's body which tries to compensate for the weakness of coenaesthetic apprehension of the lived body. Over time, the figural body ends up superimposing itself on the immediate experience of the lived body. Placing itself on a representative register, this image conveys not only individual ghosts but also cultural aspects, social prejudices, gender stereotypes. Thus, the attempt to experience one's own body with the mediation of the other's gaze becomes an involuntary and unaware throwing of oneself into the meshes of representation that are necessarily alienating for the person. Hysterical persons remain stuck in their inability to access an experience of their body that is not figurative, alienating themselves in representations which always come from outside.

Homo dissipans: Excess and Expenditure as Keys for Understanding the Borderline Condition?

This paper sheds light on some aspects of what contemporary clinical theory calls "borderline" condition providing a description of a key figure of late-modern culture that I will call Homo dissipans (from Latin dissipatio, -onis = scattering, dispersion). Homo dissipans is the opposite of Homo œconomicus, the form that "narcissism" takes on in contemporary "achievement society," solely concerned with rational action aimed to utility and production. In order to define Homo dissipans, I follow French philosopher, anthropologist, and novelist Georges Bataille's descriptions of two core phenomena: "excess" and "expenditure." The former can be defined as a surplus of energy that according to Bataille characterizes human existence, animated by a general movement of exudation and dilapidation and an inexhaustible drive to "pour out" of oneself, especially outside the limits of composure and reasonableness. The latter is an ethical attitude which gives its approval to excess and to its metamorphic and destructive power. The Homo dissipans' credo is to profitlessly dissipate the surplus of energy, escape into a world of pure intensities in which all forms - including identity - dissolve and surrender themselves to transformation. I argue that Bataille's ideas about "dissipation" can help us reconsider two features attributed to borderline personality disorder which have been extensively described and sometimes stigmatized - "identity diffusion" and "stable instability" - and to better recognize, understand, and make sense of their phenomenology in the clinical context.

Grounding co-writing: An analysis of the theoretical basis of a new approach in mental health care.

This contribution aims to highlight the theoretical and epistemological premises of the co-writing experience, a practice where a clinician and a patient are mutually engaged in jointly or collaboratively writing a narrative related to the patient's experience. Unlike a typical set of therapeutic techniques, co-writing is based on sharing perspectives and meanings about the experience of crisis, recovery, and the therapeutic process. The paper identifies and briefly describes four non-clinical epistemological paradigms on which it is grounded: ethnography, values-based practice, narrative care, and phenomenology. Although they differ in several ways, at the same time, they seem to share some common features that the paper investigates and comments. For clinicians, nurses, researchers and Mental Health Service managers, attention to the users and to the improvement of their active roles represents not only a strategy for the empowerment of results, but also the access door to a different perspective which relies on a renewed conceptualization of the mental disease nature that may lead to overcoming the epistemic asymmetry between the 'expert' and the 'other' in favor of intersubjective dialogue.

Homo œconomicus: A Key for Understanding Late Modernity Narcissism?

This paper describes the form that narcissism takes in contemporary society in the light of Homo œconomicus - a concept developed by philosopher Foucault to describe a key figure of late modernity: the entrepreneur of himself whose core values are utility (every action must be directed towards production) and optimization (what costs more than it produces is a dead branch to be cut). Homo œconomicus is the subject of so-called "achievement society." Its imperative is summed up in the formula "You can!" that generates heavy constraints because it is introjected as "If I can, then I must!," and self-coercion is more fatal than hetero-coercion because no resistance can be put up against oneself. He is also the subject of the "society of the spectacle" in which a part of the world represents itself in front of the rest of the world and shows itself to be superior to it. The spectacle is not simply a set of images, but a type of social relationship between people mediated by images, generating alienation from oneself and from the Other. Using Homo œconomicus as a grid for understanding contemporary pathological forms of narcissism, I describe the values and the life-world of narcissistic persons including the ways they experience time, space, others, and their own body. I finally suggest a therapeutic of this form of existence based on the recognition of its value-structure.

Images of depression in Charles Baudelaire: clinical understanding in the context of poetry and social history.

There is increasing recognition of the importance of the humanities and arts in medical and psychiatric training. We explore the poetry of Charles Baudelaire (1821-1867) and its evocations of depression through themes of mood, time and self-consciousness and discuss their relation to images of 'spleen', the 'snuffling clock' and the 'sinister mirror'. Following the literary critical commentaries of Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) and Jean Starobinski (1920-2019) we identify some of their roots in the poet's experience of the rapid and alienating urbanisation of 19th-century Paris. Appreciation of the rich vocabulary of poetry and the images it generates adds depth to clinical practice by painting vivid pictures of subjective experience, including subjective experience of the 'social' as part of the biopsychosocial constellation.

Anorexia nervosa as a disorder of the subcortical-cortical interoceptive-self.

PURPOSE: Anorexia nervosa (AN) is characterized by a diminished capacity in perceiving the physiological correlates of interoceptive sensations, namely bodily self-consciousness. Given the neural division of self-processing into interoceptive-, exteroceptive- and mental-self, we hypothesize neural deficits in the interoceptive-processing regions in AN. METHODS: To prove this, we reviewed resting state (rs), task and rest-task studies in AN literature. RESULTS: Neuronal data demonstrate the following in AN: (i) decreased rs-functional connectivity (rsFC) of subcortical-cortical midline structures (SCMS); (ii) reduced rsFC between medial (default-mode network/DMN and salience network/SN) and lateral (executive-control network/ECN) cortical regions; (iii) decreased rsFC in mainly the regions of the interoceptive-self; (iv) altered activity with overall increased activity in response to sensory/body image stimuli, especially in the regions of the interoceptive-self; (v) lack of a clear task-related distinction between own's and others' body image. CONCLUSION: These data may indicate that rs-hypoconnectivity between SCMS, as neural correlate of a reduced intero-exteroceptive integration resulting in self-objectification, might be linked to overall increased activity in interoceptive regions during sensory/body image stimuli in AN, engendering an "anxious bodily self." LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: I: Systematic review.

Se-duction is not sex-duction: Desexualizing and de-feminizing hysteria.

The psychopathological analysis of hysteria is a victim of narrow conceptualizations. Among these is the inscription of hysteria in the feminine sphere, about body and sexuality, which incentivized conceptual reductionism. Hysteria has been mainly considered a gendered pathology, almost exclusively female, and it has been associated with cultural and/or religious features over time rather than treated as a psychopathological world. Further, hysteria has been dominated by conceptual inaccuracies and indecision, not only in terms of clinical features but also in terms of its definition. For this reason, it seems necessary to "undress" hysteria from this feminization, sexualization, and corporealization with which it has been abundantly clothed over the years. "Undressing" hysteria will make possible a reconfiguring and deconstructing of the explanatory-causal model of Charcot and Freud. However, if we take out this cultural heritage, the stigma accompanying this diagnosis, and the weight of the enormous historical tradition that hysteria carries, the world of hysteria continues to constitute a domain full of complexity and nosographic challenges. Hysteria has been considered a sum of psychological behaviors and states illustrated by drama, mystery, or falsity. The difficulty in understanding the multiple somatic manifestations which characterize this clinical condition created several controversies and much confusion. In the current nosography, the personological component of hysteria has been separated from its symptomatic manifestation, in the Histrionic Personality Disorder and Conversion Disorder categories, respectively. This segmentation by descriptive nosography does contribute to a unitary understanding of the phenomenon and, consequently, of daily clinical practice. Clinical complexity can be grasped and deciphered only if the symptom is inscribed in the patient's lifeworld and his/her subjective life history. Clinical practice is thus thought of in terms of a structural aggregation of a homogeneous set of phenomena, together constituting a specific way of being in the world. The starting point of this article is the evident modalities characterizing this life-world, taking care not to confuse the point of origin with the point of expression.

The lived experience of psychosis: a bottom-up review co-written by experts by experience and academics.

Psychosis is the most ineffable experience of mental disorder. We provide here the first co-written bottom-up review of the lived experience of psychosis, whereby experts by experience primarily selected the subjective themes, that were subsequently enriched by phenomenologically-informed perspectives. First-person accounts within and outside the medical field were screened and discussed in collaborative workshops involving numerous individuals with lived experience of psychosis as well as family members and carers, representing a global network of organizations. The material was complemented by semantic analyses and shared across all collaborators in a cloud-based system. The early phases of psychosis (i.e., premorbid and prodromal stages) were found to be characterized by core existential themes including loss of common sense, perplexity and lack of immersion in the world with compromised vital contact with reality, heightened salience and a feeling that something important is about to happen, perturbation of the sense of self, and need to hide the tumultuous inner experiences. The first episode stage was found to be denoted by some transitory relief associated with the onset of delusions, intense self-referentiality and permeated self-world boundaries, tumultuous internal noise, and dissolution of the sense of self with social withdrawal. Core lived experiences of the later stages (i.e., relapsing and chronic) involved grieving personal losses, feeling split, and struggling to accept the constant inner chaos, the new self, the diagnosis and an uncertain future. The experience of receiving psychiatric treatments, such as inpatient and outpatient care, social interventions, psychological treatments and medications, included both positive and negative aspects, and was determined by the hope of achieving recovery, understood as an enduring journey of reconstructing the sense of personhood and re-establishing the lost bonds with others towards meaningful goals. These findings can inform clinical practice, research and education. Psychosis is one of the most painful and upsetting existential experiences, so dizzyingly alien to our usual patterns of life and so unspeakably enigmatic and human.